Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. www.erudit.org Tout droit réservé © Canadian Science and Technology Historical Association / Association pour l'histoire de la science et de la technologie au Canada, 1985 technological activity, thus adopting Schumpeter's seminal distinction. J.J. Brown based his ldza. 6 In Exile on such a distinction.^ in Schumpeter's and Kuznets' visions, innova tion is the dynamic element which spurs the rapid growth of an industry and the rapidly-growing industries will engender the economic growth of nations. Not all innovations, however, lead to growth. Beyond Schumpeter's powerful but reductionist concept of the innovating entrepreneur, it is necessary to dis tinguish between the many different types of innovations and enterprises as well as their different economic impacts. Secondly, it may be that the dynamic economic effects are more a result of how different innovations combine and reinforce each other than the indirect effect of any initial innovation. These qualifications lead us to use two concepts.
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
The first concept comes from economic history and industrial organization^ and relates to the production mode. It is impor tant to distinguish between customized production processes, batch production and line production. Such a distinction was useful in comparing nineteenth-century British and American technological development. Economically, innovative massproduced products have a greater impact than innovations de veloped for specific and isolated uses. The innovative acti vity of any country always involves a co-existence between custom, batch and assembly line production. The economic and industrial effects of innovations vary considerably depending on the scope of their applications and the scale of their pro duction. But a common feature of advanced economies is their ability to foster the transformation from a customized innova tion into full-fledged mass production where the greatest economic benefits may be reaped. It is in this transition, we suggest, that Canada may so often be deficient. Our first hypothesis is that Canadian industrial innovation tends to remain custom and small batch oriented. Consequently, one can expect to find innovative capability without many indus trial and economic benefits.
Let us first define distinctly these production modes. Custom, batch and line production may be distinguished from one another by the number of units produced in a given period. As such, they appear to the economist as part of a continuum. Although these different production modes do not differ by fixed quan tities, they are nonetheless qualitatively different. This difference is most notable in the relationship between market and production, on one hand, and the organization of produc tion work on the other. In customized production, the English tailor or gun maker would make, on order, a suit or a gun 'made to measure' the client's needs. In batch production, a manu facturer produces on order a set of parts and assembles them; and he may make a few extra in case of 'lemons' or because he anticipates further demand. The cost of a few extra units is not that great in comparison to the cost of having to manufac ture a faulty part again. Also, the opportunity for rapid earnings through the sales of additional units is a further incentive. Line production produces for stock and requires an anticipation of future market demand. The mass producer also tries to shape the market by product design and adver tizing, attempting to capture market share through his own distribution system. In addition, the mass producer finances an inventory and invests in specialized equipment.
Another concept which will be useful for subsequent analysis is that of technical 'system. 1 The French historian of tech nology, Bertrand Gilles, defines a system of interdependent techniques as a combination whose progress is dependent on the simultaneous progress of all components; the stagnation of one component technique can block the advance of the whole system. The technical momentum generated by a systems innovation is much greater than that of a single innovation.^ Systems innovations are most often combined with a standard ized, iterative, mass production process. Although some large engineering works are custom made to specifications, they then serve as the equipment for standardized processes of production. Canada more often adopts its technical systems from abroad, leaving the dynamic initiative in economic growth to come from outside the country. In the capital goods sector we often witness large, customized projects such as turbines for hy draulic power plants which are part and parcel of the move towards higher economies of scale. These are the A-lne, qua non of mass production. Our corollary hypothesis is that innova tions in complex manufacturing are marginal because they are borrowed from abroad. We rarely find the transition to mass production accompanied by associated development of indigenous manufacturing know-how. This lacuna leaves Canadian innova tive potential vulnerable to quick imitation by low cost pro ducers .
We will approach these hypotheses through a discussion of the Bombardier case, which illustrates both what is typical and what is atypical about Canadian innovation. The Bombardier story has ramifications that go beyond the Canadian context. Elsewhere, we have analyzed it with respect to the theory of technological life cycles. 7 Here, however, we will focus on this case as a testing ground for hypotheses concerning macroindustrial development in Canada.
THE CASE OF BOMBARDIER'S SNOWMOBILE
The history of Bombardier raises interesting "questions. The initial development of what was later to become the snowmobile was made as early as 1927, thus Bombardier's snowmobile tech nology has a long history.** The key invention and development on which his technical leadership and reputation is based dates from 1935.
Joseph-Armand Bombardier, the inventor, had both the leisure that is necessary for the process of trial and error which the development of a new technology requires, as well as a clear vision of the problems to be solved in order to satisfy local needs. Bombardier's living and working environment undoubtedly had an important impact on the direction of his inventive ac tivity. During the idle winter months, Valcourt, his home village, was roadless and snowbound. No 'roadmobiles,' as they The contrast between the sales and marketing of the different operations is also marked. For half a century, Bombardier's innovations were directed to special applications and therefore were less known. In spite of sustained demand for two of his models -the B12 Military transporter and the MUSKEG, allterrain industrial vehicle -J. Armand Bombardier did not standardize or mass produce any of his models before the SkiDoo. Integrated line production was only achieved after his death. Just before his death, Bombardier was still concentra ting his efforts and financial resources on industrial applica tions, in particular, the material handling problems of forestry. Given the inventive proclivity of the founder, product designs were almost as numerous as the applications of the technology.
The contrast between periods is also reflected in the length of runs. In 1927, Bombardier sold his first CLu£o-ne.<Lge. to a Valcourt Hotel owner who wanted to be able to get his customers in and out of the snowbound village. This model was a success; he ultimately sold about ten of these. Veterinarians and doc tors who needed to get to the sick quickly in winter required this adapted automobile. In the 1920s Bombardier came out with a new model every year. Each new model would incorporate a significant new technical component of the eventual technical system. The sales, however, were by unit or in small batches ( Table 1) . As a batch producer after 1937, Bombardier produced not only for individual customers but also for categories of customers. Such market segments included physicians, veterin arians, ambulance operators, mail services and governments for defence in the arctic, petroleum exploration, forest manage ment and road and sidewalk clearing. This involved anticipa ting demand and the clientele's buying capacity. But the mar ket niches remained segmented. As a line producer in the 1960s, Bombardier Ltd. sold to the consumer and the mass mar ket. A distribution network was established. Although J. Armand Bombardier did not believe in advertising, the pro fessional, Harvard-trained managers who came into the firm after his death relied heavily on more conventional marketing approaches.
From custom-designed specialty products to product variations for market segments and then finally to a standardized, simple product for the mass consumer market, Bombardier had an in creasing economic impact. At first, his adaptations of the automobile only allowed an increase of its use to a few wealthy professionals during the winter months. Later, as Bombardier developed varied industrial applications, the automotive tech nology was made available to numerous industries which bene fitted from increased performance and reduced operating costs. But wide economic impact only occurred when a product for the consumer enabled the workers of the Bombardier factories them selves to acquire, from their salaries, the simple, reliable Ski-Doo which sold at one point for as low as $600. This 'final demand linkage' with the income generation of the pro duction activities resulted in economic growth for the region. Table 1 provides an idea of the magnitude of the production runs. The yearly production runs of successful models in crease relentlessly, but not smoothly; the scale, of production increased by jerks. Little by little, as the market broadened for his product. Bombardier started to exploit economies of scale. The apparent continuum in increase in scale of pro duction, however, obscures two other phenomena: first, the importance of economies of product variation in the custom and batch mode of production and second the strategic decisions and subsequent organizational discontinuities, which were necessary in order to reap economies of scale. No sooner had one been resolved than another crisis loomed. In 1972 the snowmobile market plummeted. Although its recovery was long expected, it failed to materialize. Bombardier Ltd. was then stuck with considerable excess capacity. In 1975, with the assistance of the Caisse des Dépôts du Québec, another strategic step was taken, this time towards diversification. In addition, with the acquisition of M.L. Worthington, Bombardier Ltd. decided to buy out other transport equipment firms, becoming a multi-product firm. The snowmobile slowly became a minor part in its overall sales, althoughihe consumer and recreational market remained crucial. In the 1980s, the public transit market became the decisive one for the firm. Bombardier Ltd, however, relied now on multi-plant economies and an array of technical capabilities, and the future of the firm would never again be dependent on one product.
FROM PRODUCT VARIATION TO ECONOMIES OF SCALE

TECHNICAL SHIFT FROM PRODUCT TO PROCESS INNOVATIONS
Another condition was required before economies of scale could be fully reaped: technical developments had to shift from product to process innovation. Until 1952, all of Bombardier's innovations were product innovations. In the late 1940s some specialized machinery had been bought, but whatever process innovation there was remained at the level of individual or group know-how. But this did not imply formal engineering designs which could have an impact on equipment fabrication by Bombardier suppliers. In 1952, however, an unresolved problem provided an incentive to develop a machine. J. Armand Bombardier was dissatisfied with the slow and inadequate response that an American tire manufacturer was making to his demands for more economical production of continuous rubber treads for his snowmobiles. He invented and built a vulcanizing machine for his endless reinforced treads and tracks which allowed him to produce one every half-hour; as the tire manufacturer refused to develop the simple machine, he did it himself. Similar constraints also induced him to build a simple hydraulic press for the aluminum seat structure. The machines were simple enough to order, but he preferred to build them himself in his spare time rather than buy them at higher costs. In this way he acquired the intimate knowledge of the production techniques of his suppliers. As an inventor, he had a proclivity to do what was interesting rather than what may be considered to be immediately more economically efficient, so in 1961 he built three hydraulic presses, and a year later Canadian Vickers reproduced the set.
Tackling process technology may take various forms: learning to use general-purpose machine tools, adapting standard generalpurpose machinery to a specific task with jigs and fixtures, conceiving and designing specialized equipment, inventing new machinery, manufacturing and commercializing. These forms of acquisition of process capability all constitute a continuum. Few firms master process technology in all of these forms. Bombardier mastered his production technology in most of them.
Although he took out a patent for his 1952 vulcanizing machine in order to insure his independence from rubber manufacturers, there was little that was novel in the process. As for the 1961 hydraulic presses to shape aluminum seat structures of the Ski Doo, he adapted well-known technology. As demand for Ski Doos soared, production runs put stress on the presses, and it became necessary to have the models rebuilt by a profes sional machinery maker, Canadian Vickers. His own three presses, after working alongside Vickers 1 for a few years in the Valcourt plant -where the latter are still in operationwere later retired to a museum. Not until a decade after the inventor's death in 1972, when market saturation put pressure on the firm to cut costs, did process innovations become fre quent.
In 1972, new apparatus for making endless belts was patented. In the following year, patents were obtained for the assembly of the head lamp, the bobbie wheel and the muffler; in 1974, for the assembly of the ski bracket and for fitting the end less belts; in 1975, for the steering column construction; in 1976, for the windshield mounting and suspension spring adjust ment. All these process innovations were aimed at reducing costs of mass production. Although during that same period there was renewed product innovation, these product innova tions related to mass production process innovations.
The product innovations of the 1970s were minor systems adjust ments, such as chain tensioning systems, sheave drives, blades for suspension, ski legs, suspension wheels, tension release mechanisms, adjustments for the suspension, ski snow deflec tors, disc brakes, air intake silencers and voltage regula tors. All these product innovations made the snowmobiles more reliable but did not change the basis system. The power of the innovation came from the combination of all these innova tions and the basic coherence between all of them. The devel opment of support and ancillary components also induced ex ternal innovations in component manufacturing. thf^-oooi of°?959.
FROM SYSTEM TO INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
b°tt0m -a '^''-version of 'Hus.e^ cases, the improvement made all the difference between reliability and frequent breakdowns, adoption or rejection. The search for improvements seems to have had its own autonomous momentum with one problem leading to another. Bombardier's patent records reflect this shifting technical agenda and focus of improvements. After the initial 1958/59 design, a pulley transmission was developed to increase the speed (1962 patent). Then bearing seals were developed (1965 patent). Snow accumulated on the tread, slowing the vehicle down periodically and a snow expelling system was devised (1965) . As the vehicle increased its acceleration capacity, the transmission system represented a limit to its performance, so an automatic transmission was developed (1965) . As the vehicle needed to change speeds more frequently than a road vehicle, a variable speed transmission system was developed (1968). The speedy vehicle then required a new braking system and a patent was taken out in 1970. The rapid vehicle then provided a rocky ride and a suspension system was patented in 1972. Each technical achievement made Bombardier focus on the next limit to the performance of his vehicle, lending its own logic to the technical development. Thus evolved an interdependent system.
The development of a system also had its business dimension. J. Armand Bombardier paid close attention to the control of manufacturing for each component, whether sprocket, tread, plastic parts or aluminum parts. Almost all component technologies were developed by him, except for Arctic Cat's front ski suspension. This technical control implied direct business control of subsidiaries, usually through a relative in the Eastern Townships. The rubber components in Roskin Falls, for example, were controlled by his son Germain.
The new management was to continue this strategy of upstream control of components, sometimes by acquiring financial control of firms, as in the case of Lohnerwerke G.M.B.H. of Vienna.
The new management would also extend this vertical integration downstream to marketing, accessories, public education, regulation, sport promotion, resort and trail expansion. Much of the economic benefits of the snowmobile production accrued to the Québec Eastern Townships only because 80% of all components of the product are directly controlled by the firm and are located in the region.
The technological system of the snowmobile is accompanied today by a modest but significant complex of interrelated industrial activities, linking the main factory with component suppliers. The industrial techniques for which the firm has competence comprise bearings, springs, wheels, voltage regulators and lubrication devices. The automotive techniques include steering, transmissions, suspensions, brakes, drives, clutches and mufflers. Various shoes are used for the vehicles: skis, tracks, wheels. The firm uses different materials: aluminum, plastics, fibreglass and rubber. Furthermore, it has acquired competence in corresponding production techniques. The firm has experience in the following markets: military, transport, recreational municipal, mass consumer and many industries such as foresty and petroleum. 
SOME IMPLICATIONS
The significance of the Bombardier story for Canadian develop ment cannot yet be clearly evaluated. Is the early Bombardier story the most representative and the late mass production an exception? If innovation in Canada were confined to customs adaptation of existing systems design, the economic returns which we could expect would be limited to that of an early adopter of foreign technology. On the other hand, if Canada had developed complete systems technologies which are fairly central to its production and way of life, the economic ef fects of the innovation may be expected to be much greater.
Mass-produced innovations such as the Ski Doo have a much greater effect than those which are produced in batch and shorter runs. Our own survey^ has identified only a limited number of innovations produced in series or related to mass production since 1945: factory-produced mobile homes, Orenda gas turbine engines, PT6 gas turbine jet engines, the Chip 'N Saw, mobile spars for grapple yarding, Koehring whole-tree short wood harvesting equipment, the papriformer, the oxygen steel process, C02 immobilization of animals for slaughter 
CUSTOM BIAS
In the* equipment sector where we conducted a phone survey, some forty manufacturers represented a few hundred innova tions covering machine shops, mechanical, electrical and elec tronic equipment, instruments, aircraft and avionics. We found that a majority of innovations was produced only in a custom and small batch mode. Although small firms were more prevalent in the custom and batch production, large firms were equally involved in custom and line production. As the equipment sector is significant for technological development, this custom bias has its importance. The extent to which equipment manufacturers standardize their products will affect their capability to diffuse the products and act as pressure groups for technological change. However, the machinery sec tor is relatively marginal in Canadian industry. 
WHAT A CUSTOM BIAS IN INNOVATION WOULD EXPLAIN
A custom bias of innovation appears to be a logical explana tion for many features of Canadian development. The relatively high level of innovation in Canada could be partly explained by its extreme specialization, given the low proportion of innovators who perform Research and Development or take out patents. In unit production, product development is indis tinguishable from production itself, and the machine shop setting in Canada may constitute both the research and de velopment and production facility.Î* It may also explain why very small firms in Canada are more R&D intensive per sales than in the United States, and the fact that design, tooling up, pre-production and testing do not represent such important expenditures as they do in the USA. " If production runs are short, no such expenditures would be required. This engineer ing, design and production tooling deficiency, however, need not stop -as we have seen in the early Bombardier experiencea firm from modifying its products in response to the needs of specific clients and thus reaping economies of scope. Such custom innovation would not induce process innovation or much fixed investment. In other words, this particular type of innovation would not be growth-inducing in Schumpeter's and Kuznets' sense. The paradox of an innovative country without internal dynamic centres of growth might be partly re solved if the custom bias of Canadian innovation were con firmed.
SPECULATING ON POSSIBLE CAUSES
Such an hypothesis may also have likely causes. In examining the possible factors of such a custom bias, one can look at a number of negative constraints which hinder the passage of innovation from custom to mass production: lack of growth capital in a banking system which privileges large commercial operations and short-term loans with high interest rates that disfavour medium-and long-term industrial investment. The quantum leap involved in making a transition to production in series involves financing stock, inventories and capital out lays. Innovators find little or no financial support even when they have orders in hand. Oligopsony -the control of demand by a few -may hinder 'supplier initiative* in the cap ital goods sector. The tight oligopolistic concentration of Canadian industry may relegate innovation to the margin of each oligopoly, each using expansive innovations against the other such as aluminum against copper, plastic against metals, corn against sugar. Reliance on easily-accessible foreign tech nology may encourage merely adaptive innovations to fit the specific Canadian context, use its available materials and energy, draw on its specific work skills and traditions and mesh with its regulatory and political environment. Also, subsidiaries within multinational operations, be they Canadian or foreign, may not have the prerogative to develop complete systems. Defence production sharing with the United States seems to favour the use of Canada as a flexible machine shop for prototype development, while large-run production will usually occur in the United States.
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In our survey, we have encountered some equipment manufacturers and defence contractors who bragged about being the 'Rolls Royce of the industry (with) 15 to 20% higher prices.» Such a special type of technical leadership may not generate substantial foreign trade earnings, induce growth or contribute to a dynamic economy.
An exploration of this hypothesis would also have to include a look into countervailing forces such as the opening of free trade, the Auto-Pact and the Defence Production Sharing Agreement, along with areas of concentrated homogenous markets such as banking, medicare and the wage structure. We do not pretend that the custom bias of innovation in Canada is an established fact but only that the hypothesis is worthwhile exploring in order to resolve the paradox of an innovative country wtihout the usual attributes of a technologicallydynamic economy. 
